Language tempts us to employ locutions which rouse the fighting spirit of those who care about what exists and what doesn't. (Meyer and Lambert 1968: 15.) [Linguistics] is entirely obligated to deal with objects (Gegenstände) in word-and sentence-meanings. (Meinong 1904: 496.) 
I. SEMANTIC EXPANSION Some grammatical sentences of naturallanguages such as English seem c1early true, e.g., 'Secretariat is a race horse'; others, c1early false, e.g., ' 'Sherlock Holmes' is the name of a criminal in A Study in Scarlet'. Others, equally grammatical, seem to have no c1ear truth value; e.g., 'Pegasus is a flying horse', 'Sherlock Holmes was cured of cocaine addiction by Sigmund Freud', or 'The present Czar of Russia is a Democrat'.1
From a purely syntactic (Le., grammatical) point of view, English is not significantly different from non-natural (formal or artificial) languages, such as those underlying systems of logic or such as a regimented fragment of English as in Montague 1970a,b. 2 But there is an important semantic difference. For a formallanguage, one usually only considers semantic interpretations which are complete: for each singular referring expression in the language, there corresponds an element of the universe of discourse. More precisely, there is (at least implicitly) a semantic interpretation function, i, whose domain is the union of the syntactic categories of the language, and which is total on the sub set of its domain consisting of individual constants (perhaps induding definite descriptions). E.g., for each name n e Dom (0, there corresponds an element i (n) € Rng (i), where Rng (i) is the "domain of interpretation". It is sometimes said that i is "defined" for all names n € Dom (i) or that n "exists" (cf. Stahl 1960 , Montague 1967 .
However, naturallanguages only have a partial interpretation function when given such a set-or model-theoretic semantics whose universe of discourse (or "model") is taken to be the real, physical world. There are names in English (e.g., 'Pegasus') for which the interpretation function is undefined (the same interpretation, it should be noted, which assigns the horse Secretariat to the name 'Secretariat' or to the description 'the 1973 triple-crown winner').
To put semantics on a par with syntax for parity of treatment of natural and formallanguages, two alternatives suggest themselves. (1) The syntax of a naturallanguage can be changed so that the interpretation function becomes total. This could be accomplished, following Russell and Quine, by paraphrasing away all non-denoting expressions (e.g., improper descriptions, names from fiction), thus enabling those grammatical expressions without dear truth-value to gain one (however arbitrary). Free logics, too, can be viewed as recommendations within the realm of formal languages for such syntactic change.
Despite their elegance and fruitfulness, two lines of criticism of these programs are worth recording. First, the reforms are ad-hoc. According to Russell, a sentence like 'The present Czar of Russia is a Democrat' must be reparsed as 'One and only one thing is presently Czar of Russia, and he is aDemocrat' before being semantically interpreted. But this course of devising special syntactic changes for each new semantic problem is somewhat artificial. 3 Moreover, as Dana
